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MORALITY, COMMUNITY, AND THE
LEGAL PROFESSION
Kenneth W. Starr*
One is struck these days with the outpouring of concern throughout
our society about not simply the legal system but more generally excesses in
the marketplace. Moral judgments seem terribly clouded by ancient vices,
especially avarice, one of the great sins of humanity, and the narcissistic
desire for fame and for notoriety.
By way of sad example, a federal grand jury in Houston last July indicted former Enron Chairman and Chief Executive Officer Ken Lay on
charges of conspiracy, securities fraud, bank fraud and making false statements to a bank. Throughout his professional career, Lay had committed
himself admirably to a host of philanthropic and community activities too
lengthy to recount here.' Together with codefendants Jeff Skilling and
Richard Causey, Enron's former CEO and Chief Accounting Officer, respectively, Lay is now, however, accused of overseeing a massive corporate conspiracy to "cook the books" at Enron in an effort to inflate the company's
stock price and reap a personal financial windfall. 2 While Lay allegedly
benefited to the tune of $217 million between 1998 and 2001 through the
exercise of stock options and sale of restricted Enron stock, the ensuing collapse of Enron's false empire wiped out the retirement savings of thousands
of Enron employees and decimated the portfolios of investors.'

Dean and Professor of Law, Pepperdine University School of Law. In addition to his
*
private practice experience, Dean Starr has served as counselor to former U.S. Attorney General William French Smith, U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit judge,
Solicitor General of the United States, and Independent Counsel on the Whitewater matter.
See generally http://www.kenlayinfo.com/public/default.aspx.
1.
Press Release, U.S. Department of Justice, Former Enron Chairman and Chief Execu2.
tive Officer Kenneth L. Lay Charged with Conspiracy, Fraud, False Statements (July 8,
2004), availableat http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2004/July/04 crm_470.htm.
See Superceding Indictment at 6, U.S. v. Causey, Cr. No. H-04-25 (S-2) (S.D. Tex.
3.
filed July 7, 2004).
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Under way right now in New York is the trial of another nonlawyer
by the name of Bernie Ebbers, a former basketball coach who worked with
young people for a number of years.' He was the Chairman, Chief Executive Officer, and indeed a founder of what was once known boldly as
WorldCom. The alleged accounting fraud that infected WorldCom and for
which he is standing trial was so massive that the accountants now suggest
that it amounted to $11 billion. At trial, WorldCom's Chief Financial Officer Scott Sullivan testified very simply: "I falsified the financial statements
of our company." He elaborated on that, but he falsified it. Let the record
show this was a public company, with shareholders depending on the integrity of those individuals, men and women in positions of high authority.
That confessional statement provides us with an executive summary
of this enormous financial loss, grievous to many people, certainly to employees of WorldCom. But even more it reflects a further diminution and
loosening of a very fundamental bond in our community; the bond of trust
that is necessary for any society to flourish, especially so for a market economy. Mr. Sullivan testified that Bernie Ebbers and the other senior officers
were substantially involved in what he called "the deceit." Sullivan further
stated that "we did not disclose these accounting adjustments" that were at
the core of the fraud-and the "we" included all of senior management,
which includes lawyers.
Also in New York the trial of Dennis Kozlowski is under way, accused of hiding from Tyco's board of directors what may now seem to be a
modest sum; only $150 million, paid to himself and generously on his part to
his chief financial officer.5 According to the prosecutors in their opening
statement, "this was a carefully planned, massive theft." Tyco is a publicly
held corporation. In the South, HealthSouth's chief executive officer Richard Scrushy was accused and is in trial for masterminding a $2.7 billion accounting fraud by the old fashioned method of simply ordering his subordinates to inflate earnings, and instead of resigning they did what they were
told to do.6

4.
Ebbers was subsequently convicted on March 15, 2005 on nine counts of conspiracy,
securities fraud, and false regulatory filings. See Brooke A. Masters, WorldCom "sEbbers
Convicted, WASH. POST, March 16, 2005, at Al.
5.
Kozlowski, the former chief executive officer of Tyco International Ltd., is being
retried in New York Supreme Court on charges of, inter alia, grand larceny and securities
fraud following an earlier mistrial due to juror improprieties. See Ex-Tyco Director Testified
on Loan Program, BUSINESS WEEK ONLINE, Mar. 22, 2005, available at http://www.businessweek.comI/ap/financialnews/D89071 FO 1.htm?campaignid=apn homedown.
6.
As the first chief executive officer to be tried for charges of false corporate reporting
under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Scrushy initially faced 58 criminal counts in the U.S. District
Court for the Northern District of Alabama. See Complaint for Injunctive and Other Relief,
SEC v. Scrushy, CV-03-J-0615-S (N.D. Ala. filed Mar. 19, 2003), available at
http;//www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/comphealths.htm (last visited May 2, 2005).
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Now one might say your examples are business executives, not lawyers, but we also know that there have been stories about the role of lawyers
and trials involving the role of lawyers, so the issue is not simply one for
business schools or for economics departments but it is also one for our
schools of law. Where were the lawyers, including of course both the outside as well as the inhouse lawyers? What are the lessons that we are to
glean from this, in addition to refocusing on the fundamental, bedrock quality of basic integrity?
In each of these large corporate scandals, regardless of criminal culpability, indeed regardless of any eventual civil liability questions, what we
do know beyond any doubt is that the public was misled, the public was deceived. And the upshot of that was the substantial diminishing of confidence
in the ethics of the marketplace. And naturally Congress responded as one
would expect Congress to do, as did regulatory authorities, especially the
Securities and Exchange Commission, with statutory and regulatory initiatives the most prominent of which is known to the corporate community as
Sarbanes-Oxley. 7 But there are other issues that are competing quite directly
for the attention of the legal community that are in fact placed right on the
doorstep of lawyers. Lawyers in public service, lawyers in the U.S. Justice
Department and the White House who authored or were otherwise privy to
the "torture memorandum" as it is now called, the August 2002 memorandum concerning the appropriateness of treatment of suspected al Qaeda
members captured in the war on terror. We have just been through a very
rancorous confirmation hearing for our new Attorney General Judge Gonzalez, a man with a very distinguished record but nevertheless the rancor at
that hearing was quite palpable. Why? Because of issues with respect to the
judge's interpretation of the Geneva Conventions, their applicability to
Guantanamo and other detainees, and the treatment of even U.S. citizens. In
light of these issues and in a broad sense, lawyers-and especially international lawyers-are focusing on our membership as a nation in the international community. And while perhaps this seems remote and far away to
many of us, the issues that are raised both by these corporate scandals involving lawyers inside and outside and by these international activities involving public lawyers brings us right to home to the question of what is it
that we expect of lawyers?
The vision that I set forth herein is going to sound very much not
like a set of rules, but rather as a vision based more on foundational principles. And I also want to lift up a vision, call it a lens, through which I will
be analyzing the role of lawyers, and I am going to call it, without apology, a
moral vision, the moral equation. One of my guides is authored by Notre
Dame's much beloved law school professor Tom Shaffer and Pepperdine's

7.

Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 15 U.S.C. §§ 7201-7266 (LexisNexis 2005).
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own Bob Cochran entitled Lawyers, Clients, and Moral Responsibility.' We
once were happy as a society to talk about morality; we are a bit more cautious about it these days. I am not going to be. I am not going to be cautious
at all. And so if I give offense I apologize in advance, but the observations
that follow will be lifting up a moral vision.
Let me begin with a case that occurred some few years ago but continues to swirl in the minds of those who think about professional responsibility and consider what is the role of the lawyer. This is a murder case in
Utah, analyzed in some detail by my esteemed Pepperdine colleague Bob
Cochran in a separate law review article.9 As detailed by Professor Cochran,
the case involved a double murder, and the murderer who confessed was
Von Lester Taylor. Mr. Taylor broke into a cabin in Utah and what happened was a great horror. He shot and killed two persons, a mother and a
grandmother, he wounded the father, he kidnapped two young daughters,
and he tried to set the cabin on fire. He was promptly apprehended before he
did further mischief to the two daughters. Taylor pled guilty to double murder and his attorney, a private attorney in Utah, sought to portray him in a
death case as, in the words of Mr. Levin, the counsel, "remorseful, contrite,
and repentant."' 0
Listen to the morality in those terms. That is not technical legal jargon. Mr. Levin in going to the jury of citizens is using the language of morality. Remorse, contrition, repentance; there is even a bit of theology there.
What was he trying to do? He was trying to avoid the death penalty for his
client. In the course of his closing argument, Mr. Levin described his approach in counseling, as a criminal defense lawyer, guilty clients: "I feel it's
my obligation to get [guilty clients] to take the first step, and that is to come
forth, admit their wrongdoing [and live with] .. . the appropriate punishment."" He argued that the guilty plea was that first step on the road, as it
were, to recovery; a recovery of his fundamental morality as a human being,
accepting the responsibility for the horrific acts that he had committed. And
because of the client's taking that first step, the attorney went on, his life
should be spared. The jury sentenced him to death.

8.
THOMAS L. SHAFFER & ROBERT F. COCHRAN, JR., LAWYERS, CLIENTS, AND MORAL
RESPONSIBILITY (1994).
9.
See Robert F. Cochran, Jr., Crime, Confession, and the Counselor-at-Law: Lessons
from Dostoyevsky, 35 Hous. L. Rav. 327, 331 (1998).
10.
Id. at 329 (citing Stephen Hunt, Judge Rules Defense Was Adequatefor Killer,Judge
Affirms Job of Public Defender, SALT LAKE TRm., June 10, 1995, at B1, available at 1995
WL 3140868).
11.
Id. (citing excerpts of defense counsel Levine's closing arguments as quoted in State
v. Holland, 876 P.2d 357, 362 (Utah 1994) (Stewart, J., concurring)).
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This tactic by the lawyer was severely criticized on grounds of professional responsibility by two justices of the Utah Supreme Court. 12 This
kind of lawyering, they contended, was utterly incompatible with our adversary system. These justices stated: "It is not the role of defense counsel to
persuade a defendant to plead guilty because counsel concludes that the defendant committed a crime," for "the practical effect of that philosophy is to
nullify our adversarial system and to deny the defendant the effective assistance of counsel."' 3 The justices went on to suggest that the defense counsel
should simply explain the options to the client and then allow the client to
make the choice of whether to plead guilty. 4
So what is the lawyer's proper role in this context? The widely accepted role which we inherit as part of our legal culture is that of the zealous
advocate who deliberately will put on a set of blinders and will ask the client
to do the same thing. The lawyer at times will want to blind herself to the
facts: "Do not tell me whether you committed the offense. I don't want to
know that." Not all lawyers, but it is not an uncommon practice.
Furthermore, the lawyer in the adversarial and traditional model
wants the client to likewise for his or her own sake put on a set of blinders.
"Even if you're inclined to talk to the police, don't. Give the police nothing.
Exercise your constitutional right to remain silent." It is part of our beloved
and fundamentally important constellation of textually enumerated rightsthe Fifth Amendment privilege. "Put the government to the task of proving
all elements of the charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt; we may not
even have to put on a case."
My colleague, Professor Cochran, who himself was a trial lawyer in
Virginia but has spent the last two decades thinking and reflecting on these
kinds of issues of professional responsibility, wonders about this traditional
adversarial model. He inquires whether there is a role for a lawyer to engage
in reasoned moral discourse, going beyond simply, as Justices Stewart and
Durham of the Utah Supreme Court would say, just identifying quite neutrally, the options and allowing the client to decide. Is it permissible, Professor Cochran inquires, to broaden the lens of moral inquiry in this professional relationship and to be in moral dialogue to identify the client's options
and to help assess the needs of the client more holistically? Professor Cochran worries about what I would call the moral isolation of the criminal defendant. Let me quote from a law review article just a few years ago from
Professor Cochran:

12.
Holland,876 P.2d at 361 (Stewart, J., concurring) (arguing in a concurrence joined by
Justice Durham that "Levine has demonstrated.., a fundamental and underlying misconception of the defense attorney's role").
13.
Id. at 362-63.
14.
Cochran, supranote 9, at 330 (citing Holland, 876 P.2d at 362).
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Lawyers who prohibit client confession may protect the client's freedom vis a vis the state, but they limit the client's
freedom in another sense. They impose isolation on the client. . . . They ignore the possibility that the client might
seek goals other than freedom, such as forgiveness, reconciliation, and a clear conscience; they ignore the possibility
that the client might want to confess. 5
With what I think is penetrating insight, Professor Cochran contends
that the traditional adversarial model-the client clams up, eschews transparency, and puts the government to the task of proving the case-may in
fact be profoundly disserving to the client's deepest needs as a human being
by indulging an irrebuttable presumption or premise that freedom, liberty, is
the summum bonum, the highest good. And to deepen the conversation, Professor Cochran looks to literature, including in particular the haunting works
of the nineteenth century Russian novelist Fyodor Dostoyevsky, celebrated
author of Crime and Punishment and Brothers Karamotsov. Professor
Cochran, having mastered the literature of Dostoyevsky writes this: "The
novels of Fyodor Dostoyevsky recognize the importance of freedom, but
they place it in perspective; they suggest that confession, forgiveness, reconciliation, and a clear conscience may be of greater importance than freedom."16 He goes on:
Dostoyevsky's stories show the bitter fruit of unconfessed
guilt: deception of self and others, additional evil, hyperactivity, moral neutrality, hypocrisy, isolation, guilt feelings,
and loss of identify. He shows that confession can bring
peace, joy, forgiveness, reconciliation, and a renewed sense
of one's identity, but that it can also bring damage to reputation, stress, criminal punishment, and damage to family."
Dostoyevsky valued community and he worried as a lover of mother
Russia about the loss of community in the context of the criminal justice
system. This is a provocative and deeply controversial vision of the lawyer
of the next century. Not of the past century, because that was the lawyer of
the adversarial model. But what Professor Cochran and frankly others
around the country are lifting up is the lawyer as a genuinely involved and
helpful moral actor, and is grounded in the vision of the lawyer in community. Like the client, the lawyer under this view should not be atomistic and
isolationist. The lawyer should be ever mindful of community and its demands and the potential need for the defendant, the client, to reenter com-

15.
16.
17.

Cochran, supra note 9, at 331
Cochran, supranote 9, at 332.
Cochran, supranote 9, at 333.
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munity, and indeed to be aware of the client's perhaps profoundly deeply felt
desire to reenter community.
Now this perhaps is not as unorthodox as it may seem at first blush
because the criminal law already recognizes this acceptance of responsibility. Our federal judges are now struggling with what to do with the criminal
sentencing guidelines and their signposts, but what we do know is that historically the acceptance of responsibility---"do you accept responsibility for
what you have done?"-is a moral term, not a technical legal term. Lawyers
talking to judges at sentencing time will say "my client accepts his or her
responsibility, he or she is genuinely sorrowful." As my occasional client,
Walter Fauntroy, who served alongside Dr. King says, "Is the person filled
with godly sorrow?" You might not talk that way in front of a judge, but
pastors talk that way. Acceptance of responsibility we say is a good thing,
but why? Why don't we, if we really believe in the adversarial model, simply put the premium on success in the marketplace, namely in the trial? That
is, shouldn't we be saying if we truly believe in the adversarial model that if
you beat the rap, you take the government's best shot but are left standing,
then you should be honored. Society should praise you and honor you because you are a success. The government tried to take you down, but you
and your lawyer came out on top, and now you're a free man or woman, we
praise you, we honor you, and now enjoy your freedom.
At a very basic level of broadly shared notions of justice, that does
not sound right. We may say that we like it that someone beat the rap, but
we don't want society to operate that way, because don't we at least in the
western tradition believe that, as Cicero put it, "justice renders to every one
his due."' 8 Isn't that what we say when we talking about due process? It is
not just process, it is that process which is due, tethered closely to society's
norms and those norms unfold, they evolve, and they mature, as the Supreme
Court has said in Trop v. Dulles. 9 Our sense of fairness has both a substantive and procedural dimension when we pause and analyze it, including a
sense of proportionality, that the punishment should fit the crime, but surely
we also say crime-once there has been procedural fairness-should involve
some form of sanction. It may not be incarceration, it may be restitution to
the victim, but there has to be some form of justice, of giving that which is
due because you took that which did not belong to you, or you took a human
life, or you injured someone.
Aren't we uncomfortable at least at a moral level saying it is okay to
convict an innocent person? We recoil at that. And especially do we recoil
MIARcus TULLIUS CICERO, DE RE PUBLICA-DE LEGIBUS I, 15 (Clinton Walter Keyes
18.
trans., Harvard University Press, 1928).
See Trop v. Dulles, 345 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) ("The [Eighth] Amendment must draw
19.
its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
society.").
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these days with focuses on the importance of DNA evidence where we know
it is vitally important. And thus certainly all reasonable persons in American
society would say we cannot tolerate the execution of an innocent person.
That's the community speaking the voice of morality, that we as a just society are aspiring to be a more just society, and we the larger community simply will not tolerate-if we can stop it-unfairness to our own.
In the current age we are quite willing to impose demands on instruments of societal power even to those who are outside of our community.
The Supreme Court's decision just last June in the Guantanamo detainee
case makes this powerfully clear. The case of Rasul v. Bush2" involved nonU.S. persons who have never been on U.S. soil and who were taken into
custody in the theater of battle in Afghanistan. Many protest their innocence
that they were swept up, but it is not disputed they were physically there and
they are non-U.S. persons. And yet our Supreme Court speaking through the
voice of Justice Stevens said our writ runs even to them, that there must be
some basic elemental fairness extended even to those persons who are outside our community. That's how strong our shared sense of fairness is.
What's more, a very respected federal judge in Washington, D.C., Judge
Robertson, has declared now that those Guantanamo detainees apprehended
in the theater of battle in Afghanistan who come before U.S. military commissions or tribunals are entitled to even greater procedural protections than
the government is already providing under a fairly elaborate military order,
one that includes a presumption of innocence. 2 Indeed, we applaud those
moral values embodied in exquisitely transnational and deliciously multicultural documents such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, entered
into by the global community in the wake of the unspeakable horrors of
World War II. And lawyers are continually invoking these transnational
documents and calling on persons of good will everywhere to abide by these
documents and to act as responsible members of a broad global community.
At an even broader level, one that transcends the very important but
nonetheless narrow duties of a lawyer representing her client, I invite our
attention to a powerful statement of the lawyer's duty in community. In
particular let me focus on an important book, now some few years old, by
the immediate past dean of the Yale Law School, Anthony Kronman. The
book is entitled, sadly, The Lost Lawyer.2 While that is discouraging
enough, the subtitle is likewise not a real cause for celebration: FailingIdeals of the Legal Profession. Dean Kronman speaks in explicitly moral terms
and his vision is rather apocalyptic. The first words of the book: "This book
is about a crisis in the American legal profession. Its message is that the

20.
124 S. Ct. 2686 (2004).
21.
See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 344 F. Supp. 2d 152 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
22.
ANTHoNY T. KRoNMAN, THE LoST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF
PROFESSION 2-3 (1993).
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profession now stands in danger of losing its soul."2 While Yale has a divinity school, the law school doesn't ordinarily speak I think in those theological terms of a community losing its soul.
Why? Why speak in terms of community, why speak in terms of a
profession in danger of losing its soul? Let me make it clear, Dean Kronman
is not a theologian, but he is a trained philosopher who achieved a doctorate
in philosophy before he entered law school. This is a book of moral philosophy and it is about right and wrong. And yes, I will go ahead and say it;
it is about good and that which is non-good, that which society once called
evil. Dean Kronman writes about a crisis in the profession, what he calls a
crisis of morale, and these are his words:
This crisis is, in essence, a crisis of morale. It is the product
of growing doubts about the capacity of a lawyer's life to
offer fulfillment to the person who takes it up. Disguised by
the material well-being of lawyers, it is a spiritual crisis that
strikes at the heart of their professional pride.
This crisis has been brought about by the demise of an older
set of values that until quite recently played a vital role in
defining the aspirations of American lawyers. At the very
center of these values was the belief that the outstanding
lawyer-the one who serves as a model for the rest-is not
simply an accomplished technician but a person of prudence
or practical wisdom as well. It is of course rewarding to become technically proficient in the law. But earlier generations of American lawyers conceived their highest goal to be
the attainment of a wisdom that lies beyond technique-a
wisdom about human beings and their tangled affairs that
anyone who wishes to provide real deliberative counsel
must possess. They understood this wisdom to be a trait of
character that one acquires only by becoming a person of
good judgment, and not just an expert in the law. To those
who shared this view it seemed obvious that a lawyer's life
could be deeply fulfilling. For the character-virtue of prachuman excellence that has an intical wisdom is a central
24
trinsic value of its own.
Notice the moral language. Dean Kronman yearned for a return to
the age of what he calls the lawyer-statesman. The lawyer, the man or
woman of wisdom, lawyers of discernment, persons of great judgment. He
lifts up the example of Lincoln in facing the unprecedented task of saving
23.
24.

Id. at 1.
Id. at 2-3.
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the union. Lincoln did not rely upon his coursework or his CLE credits. He
of course had not taken any course, nor was there CLE. He had only undertaken the great course of informal study followed by apprenticing. He relied
rather on wisdom, on judgment born of vast experience, and deep but limited
reading grounded in Shakespeare and the Bible, and of course that ubiquitous source of wisdom and learning on the American frontier, as well as in
Philadelphia law offices, Blackstone on the Common Law.
A century later emerged the towering example of Robert Jackson, a
great Justice of the Supreme Court for whom William Hobbes Rehnquist
clerked. A farm boy in western New York, Robert Jackson could not afford
to go to college, so like Lincoln he read. And guess what he read; Shakespeare and the King James Version of the Bible. He finally marshaled
enough resources to attend one year and only one year of law school, as it
was then known as the Albany Law School, and there he fell under the spell
of a dynamic young state senator from down-state, Franklin Delano Roosevelt. With this limited, call it deprived, background, Robert Jackson, selfeducated farm boy, became one of the towering influences in twentieth century American law and is grievously under appreciated in the American legal
system. He is remembered more popularly in history for his remarkable role
as a sitting justice as chief U.S. prosecutor at the war crimes tribunal in Nuremberg, a product, of course, of World War II. Jackson is best remembered
in American constitutional law for his magnificent opinions in cases like
West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, " where he lifted up the
vision in the most eloquent language in our judicial literature of freedom of
the mind. Or the steel seizure case where he told President Roosevelt's successor, President Truman, that he had exceeded his authority as the President
of the United States and that concurring opinion now serves as the canon for
separation of powers analysis.26 This was a great man. A lawyer-statesman
who tried cases in Jamestown and elsewhere but who could also argue cases
in the United States Supreme Court and try Nazi war criminals in Nuremberg with brilliance, and one who wrote greatly, not just judicial opinions
but avocationally as well.
Is it over? Dean Kronman seems to think so. Moreover, he thinks
that the ideal has a present and clear danger for the American political system. Drawing from Tocqueville's observations about the American aristocracy, it is not the landed gentry-the folks who own plantations or vast
farms or even ranches-that is the aristocracy, rather the aristocracy is the
lawyer. That is the person who is guiding the fortunes of the polity, not exclusively but disproportionately for the profession. It is Dean Kronman's
vision that
25.
319 U.S. 624 (1943)
26.
See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634-55 (1952) (Jackson,
J., concurring).
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[T]he demise of the lawyer-statesman ideal means that the
lawyers who lead the country will on the whole be less
qualified to do so than before. They will be less likely to
possess the traits of character-the prudence or practical
wisdom-that made them good leaders in the past. Like
rippled on a pond, the crisis of values that has overtaken the
legal profession in the last twenty-five years must thus in
time spread through the whole of our political life with destructive implications for lawyers and nonlawyers alike.27
Think of it. We should be more qualified, but at least according to
this vision, our polity itself is going to suffer from the demise of this vision,
a moral vision of the lawyer.
Now one may rightly say that Lincoln and Robert Jackson and similar worthies, giants in the law, lived in a radically different time. It was a
time not only of a smaller and more cohesive bar, but also perhaps of a
small-town America which has long since disappeared. There is indeed a
sense that an entirely different era is upon us, which we can simply call the
post-Enron and post-WorldCom era, and perhaps it is even the post torture
memo era. While there remains a good deal of still-unfolding commentary,
the lawyer among others in a business context now operates much more by
the mandate of Congress in a transparency mode, requiring not an adversarial nature but requiring specific steps that boil down to this: "Go up the ladder." If potential wrongdoing is afoot, you do not sit on the information, you
report it up the chain of command. The notion is very controversial and a
number of bar associations are troubled by this because it tugs at the traditional attorney-client privilege. But what the profession now has is a congressionally mandated honor code implemented by the Securities and Exchange Commission.
Let me be clear that although this is the law of the land and must be
scrupulously obeyed, there is another voluntary model of moral conduct in
the marketplace and that is the culture of Johnson and Johnson. I had the
privilege in private practice to deal with the Johnson & Johnson culture, and
in the course of that I found myself being steeped into the culture. In my
world view as a Christian we all sin and fall short of the glory of God, so I
am not holding any company up as a complete model of perfection. But for
those who remember the Tylenol tampering scare, the instantaneous decision
made by Johnson & Johnson senior management was "total recall now."
They did so without consulting with crisis management advisors, without the
lawyers issuing a legal opinion; they simply repaired to their own statement
of corporate ethics. And when they read the statement of corporate ethics,
the interests of the shareholders were last on the pole. The first obligation to
27.

KRONMAN, supra note 22, at 4.
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Johnson & Johnson as stated by its own corporate code of ethics was "to our
physicians and our consumers." From the Johnson & Johnson perspective,
the physicians and health care providers who use and apply and administer
our products and our consuming public who go to pharmaceutical stores or
Costco and avail themselves of our product, we owe our first moral obligation to them.
Did that give rise to a shareholder derivative suit: "You mean you're
not trying to maximize shareholder wealth?" Well guess what? By following their own rule of ethics, Johnson & Johnson stock quickly recovered and
it has had a magnificent run even by Warren Buffett standards. Why? Because the people have confidence that there is a culture of morality and caring.
This is the culture of right-doing. It is thoughtful, it is deeply analytical, but it is driven by principle, grounded by a moral vision of the good.
The fundamental idea of the culture of right-doing is that we all live and
move and have our being in moral community and not in isolation, and that
to the extent that our models are driven by the isolationist model we may
want to start rethinking them. We celebrate our communities and we cluster
into communities according to birth and family relationships, but as we mature and grow we then develop and apply our own moral vision and world
view that brings us to do things and to assemble and associate together as we
wish. But it is not simply community, where one simply asks "Is there a
community here? Great, I want to join it." You want to know the purpose
of the community, the mission of the community. In short, the community
defines itself by principles, by mission.
And so I leave you with these principles:
The principle of integrity. This is foundational, and non-negotiable;
in law, in business, and indeed in life itself.
The principle of human dignity of all persons. Human dignity of
course encompasses that which we speak of so rightly in our profession, and
that is civility. You treat nobody in an uncivil way.
The principle of excellence, that we will not only be competent but
we are going to do our very best. If we are going to "just do it," why not do
it the best.
And then there is the principle of compassion, which so easily
breaks into familiar subcategory of pro bono work. Our pro bono commitments reflect our compassion as citizens, citizens at home reaching out into
underserved communities and addressing their needs, not just legally, but
more broadly.
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol5/iss2/1
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Perhaps Cicero best embraces these community-defining principles
with a quote that is both unifying and moral: "Justice; the skill to treat with
consideration and wisdom those with whom we are associated."28 A less
minimalist vision than "to each person his or her due," one in which "consideration" can certainly be read to countenance civility and the inherent
dignity of all persons. It may even embrace compassion.

28.
MARCUS TULLIUS CICERO, DE OFFICIIS (Walter Miller trans., Loeb ed., Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1913), available at http://www.arts.cuhk.edu.hk/-lha/latinlessons/officium/virtue.html.
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